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THE USE OF FORMER TESTIMONY
Former testimony is susceptible of a variety of uses. The
witness who delivered it, not testifying in the later trial, proof of
what he asserted as a witness in an earlier trial may be received
in order to give the thus proven assertions the same effect as if they
had been made by the witness before the tribunal in the later trial.
The witness who previously testified may have testified again.
It may, for some reason, be desirable to corroborate him, and, in
order to do so, it may be shown that he testified in a former investigation and that his former testimony corresponded with his
present.'
The party adversely affected by the witness's present
testimony, may wish to lessen its weight by showing that his
earlier testimony, in another investigation, is inconsistent with
that which he has just delivered. There are other uses that may
be made of the testimony of a witness. The right of a party to
the present suit may depend on the result of some earlier litigation and so make the ground of the decision of that earlier litigation relevant. A has been induced to buy a judgment note purporting to be made by X, by what purports to be X's certificate
of no defense; Y is a subscribing witness to this certificate, thus
causing A to believe it genuine. Subsequently, judgment being
entered on the note, X applies to the court to open it on the
ground that her name has been forged to the note and to the certificate.
A then sues Y for deceit.
The testimony of X, in
the suit against her, that her name had been forged, is admissible, not for the purpose of proving the fact testified to, but for
the purpose of proving the ground on which she applied for the
'Henderson v. Jones, 10 S. & R. 322; Good v. Good, 7 W. 195.
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opening of the judgment.'
In a suit on a special warranty in a
deed, the plaintiff, from whom the land has been recovered in
ejectment by X, needs to show that the title under which X succeeded was derived from the warrantor. He can do this by
showing the testimony of the witnesses for X in the ejectment.'
In A's proceeding before a justice of the peace, to recover possession of land from B, his tenant, B alleges that he has a lease
which covers the current year, and succeeds in retaining the possession. When A distrains for the rent of one of the quarters of
this year, B replevies the goods, denying that he is a tenant and
owes any rent. The testimony of B's witness before the justice,
that B had a lease for the year, was admissible at A's instance, in
the replevin, not to prove that there was such a lease, but that B
alleged that there was, and called witnesses to prove it. A having been forced to acquiesce in B's retention of possession of the
premises, B is estopped to deny the lease.'
TESTIMONY USED ASSERTIVELY.
OPPORTUNITY TO
CROSS-EXAMINE
When a witness has testified on the call of a party, that party
may, under certain circumstances, use his testimony in a later
trial as if it had been delivered in that trial. In so using it he affects the opposite party. One of the conditions upon which he
can thus affect that party, is, that that party was at the former
trial able to control the examination, by proper objections,.if
it deviated from proper channels, and to cross-examine the witness. There must have been an opportunity to cross-examine
and the party to be affected must have known that he had this
right and have been able to exercise it. Thus A, being accused of
'Anderson v. Snyder, 14 Super. 424. The defendant Y was not a
party to the earlier investigation of the genuineness of the judgment
note.
2Leather v. Poultney, 4 Binn. 352. A has prosecuted B, who is
acquitted. B sues A for malicious prosecution. In order to show probable cause, A offered the notes of testimony of witnesses then before
the magistrate who issued the warrant. The notes, says the court, were
properly rejected because the witnesses were living and in the jurisdiction of the court. Hindekoper v. Cotton, 3 W. 56.
'Hostetter v. Hykas, 3 Brewst. 162.
'Norris v. Monen, 3 W. 465 (Bjectment); Watson v. Gilday, 11 S. &
R. 337 (Bjectment).
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murder before a magistrate, a witness, X, testified for the commonwealth in his presence.
But A was not represented by
counsel and was not informed of his right to cross-examine. He
was a foreigner, acquainted with the language of the witness, but
not with English, in which the proceedings were conducted. He
did not cross-examine. It was improper to allow the testimony
of the witness X to be repeated at the trial by the stenographer
at the instance of the commonwealth. 1 The actual cross-examination of the witness by the party to be affected 2 is of course proof
of the opportunity to cross-examine, but when that opportunity
exists, abstinence from the use of it, or even absence from the
trial, 3 will not preclude the future use of the witness's testimony.'
There must be an apparent necessity to cross-examine, or to object to the relevancy and competency of testimony. If there is a
clear ground on which the plaintiff must fail, apparently the defendant is not bound to cross-examine the witness with respect to
other matters, and, if he does not, the testimony of the witness
with regard to these other matters will not be receivable against
him at a future trial. A, claiming as executor of S, brings ejectment against B. The court decides that S died intestate as to
the land and that A, therefore, cannot recover. A, however,
calls certain witnesses to prove certain facts. B has the right, relying on the clear want of title in A, to refrain from cross-examination, and in a subsequent ejectment by A, after he has acquired.
the title of S's heirs, he cannot use the testimony of his witnesses in
the first suit.'
IDENTITY OF PARTIES

In order that testimony in one trial should be receivable in
a later, to which X is a party, and to affect X adversely, it is
necessary that the parties should have been the same in the earlier
'Com. v. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277. In Brown v. Com., 73 Pa. 321, the
prisoner was represented by counsel at the preliminary investigation, and
in Com. v. Keck, 148 Pa. 639, his counsel actually cross-examined the
witness.
2
Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26; murder, previous trial.
'Walbridge v. Knipper, 96 Pa. 48.
'Steel v. Nichols' Adm., 3 Dist. 517; Zell v. Benjamin, 1 Walk. 113;
Walbridge v. Knipper, 96 Pa. 48.
5
Sample v. Coulson, 9 W. & S. 62.
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as in the later." The plaintiff or defendant in the earlier may be
defendant or plaintiff in the latter.2 The interest of a party in
the earlier, may by his death grant, etc., have passed to another
who represents it in the latter.' In the first case, Jane Gallagher
and John Write were defendants. In the second case Jane
Gallagher alone was defendant. The action was trover and conversion for twenty-three bonds of the United States. Testimony
in the first case could be used against the plaintiff in the second."
In replevin the parties were C. v. W. and M. In a subsequent
assumpsit the parties were C. v. W. The subject matter was the
same, and B had testified for the plaintiff about it in the first suit.
This testimony was receivable in the second against W.' A files
a bill to have a deed made by him to B and C declared void, on
the ground that it was an escrow, and that the condition had not
been performed. Subsequently to A's death, B brings ejectment
for the land against A's devisees. He could properly use evidence
furnished under the bill.' Judgment against X, who has died,
having several heirs, one of whom pays the judgment, and, receiving an assignment of it, revives it after it is more than twenty
years old. Another heir obtains a rule to strike off this judgment.
The use plaintiff in the judgment testifies under the rule. The
rule is made absolute. Subsequently, in partition the land is
sold, and in distribution of the proceeds among the heirs, payment of this judgment is claimed. As there were several heirs
who were not parties to the proceeding to strike off, the testimony
therein of the use-plaintiff could not be proven in the distribution proceedings." Actual identity of the parties, not nominal,
is the criterion. A suit is brought by A on a note, in the name
of Parmentier. Evidence is given as to his interest in the note,
"McCully v. Barr, 17 S. & R. 445.
'Moore v. Pearson, 6 W. & S. 51. The first ejectment was A and
B v. C; the second, C v. D and E, heirs of A, and F, purchaser from B.

Cf. Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25.
3The substitution of an executor or administrator for the party in
the first suit is no obstacle to use in the second of testimony delivered
in the
first; Evans v. Reed, 78 Pa. 415.
4
Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108.
'Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102.
'Eckman v. Eckman, 68 Pa. 460.
'Roberts v. Powell, 210 Pa. 594.
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and as to the liability of the defendant to somebody. Parmentier
testifies that he has no interest in the note and has not authorized
the suit. A verdict for the defendant on that ground is rendered.
Another action on the note is brought by the real owner of it.
The testimony upon the merits, given upon the first trial, the
witness being now dead, may be given in evidence. There was
the same defendant. There was really the same plaintiff, who in
the first case used the name of Parmentier. 1 Exact identity of
parties is not essential. Where the first suit was by parties interested in an estate by virtue of a will, against the executor thereof,
the fact that in the second suit, other persons similarly and nonantagonistically interested under the same provisions of the will
are joined as plaintiffs with the original plaintiffs, will not prevent the use in the second of depositions taken in the first. 2 A
sues B on a note under seal. A has been prosecuted for forging
the note and convicted. The testimony of the witness for the
prosecution, now dead, cannot be used by the defendant, in the
civil suit, to prove that the note is a forgery. 3
SAME SUBJECT MATTER
The subject matter of the first suit must have been the same
as that of the second, or it must have been embraced in that of
the second or it must have embraced that of the second. If one
ejectment is for one aliquot part of a tract, and another later, for
another aliquot part of the same land, the testimony in the
earlier cannot be used in the later. 4 In an ejectment by A (a
child of M) v. X, in which the validity of M's will is denied, evidence in another ejectment by another child of M, and therefore for
another aliquot part of the land, is not receivable. 5 Apparently, the
same title to land must be involved in the two cases. If, in the first
ejectment, a party claims as executor of X, and the court decides
that as executor, he has no title, and he subsequently acquires
the title of the heirs of X, and another ejectment is instituted,
the evidence given in the first is not receivable in the second

'Hocker v. Jamison, 2 W. & S. 438.
'Graham's E state, 12 Dist. 415.
'Harger v. Thomas, 44 Pa. 128.
4

Norris v. Monen, 3 W. 465. But while the defendant was the same
in both, the plaintiffs were different, being contestants of the same land.
AMcCully v. Barr, 17 S. & R. 445.
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suit.' In a suit by B v. A, a question was as to the title to a
part of the land conveyed by a certain deed. A later suit by A
v. B was for the price of certain other land. But, a question
arising in both and material to the issue was the boundaries and
extent of a tract known as the "Annan Farm." The testimony
concerning this matter in the former suit was receivable in the
later.' Deed by A and wife to B. B conveys the land to C and
C to D. After B's conveyance to C, B files a bill in equity
against A and wife, to procure a correction of the acknowledgement of the deed. The defendants to the bill are A and wife, and
C. In a subsequent ejectment by D against A and wife, it was
held that the testimony of A, called for cross-examination, in the
proceedings on the bill, could not be received in the ejectment for A and wife because neither the issue nor the parties
were the same, and C could not have objected to the testimony
of A.'
FORMER TESTIMONY MUST HAVE BEEN COMPLETE
AND REGULAR

The former testimony must have been as complete as the
parties desire it to be. ]Even the party who calls the witness may
successfully object to the reception in a later trial, of the testimony of the witness, if after his examination in chief, and his
cross-examination, he is desired by the party calling him to return, the next morning, for a continuation of his examination,
but fails to do so. 4 Testimony delivered before a witness is
sworn could not be receivable in a subsequent suit, unless the
irregularity had been waived; but when a witness delivered testimony before a committing magistrate, before being sworn, but
was then sworn, and then repeated all his testimony, the testimony that followed the oath-taking was receivable in the trial,
the witness then being dead.'
'Sample v. Coulson, 9 W. & S. 62.
'Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25.

The parties and subject matter must

be the same. A party who calls a witness in one case is not to be affected by his testimony, therein given, in a later case with another
party, and concerning another subject. He has not so accredited the
witness as to make what the witness says, his own admission. McDermott v. Hoffman, 70 Pa. 31.
3
Land Co. v. Weidner, 169 Pa. 359.
4
Noble v. McClintock, 6 W. & S. 58.
5
Com. v. Keok, 148 Pa. 639.
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WHICH PARTY MAY USE PREVIOUS TESTIMONY

The party against whom the witness has been called in the
former trial finding it useful to himself, may desire to use it in
the later trial. He may so use it.' But, it is ordinarily the party
who called the witness at the first trial who finds it beneficial to
himself, and therefore attempts to employ it in the second.
TESTIMONY OF PARTY
The plaintiff or the defendant may call the opposite party, as
for cross-examination. Under circumstances allowing him to use,
in a later trial the testimony of a witness in a former trial, he may
use this testimony. Thus in a sci fa sur mechanics' lien, the
plaintiff called one of two defendants for cross-examination. At
the second trial, this defendant could not be found. The plaintiff could prove her former testimony.' A party, plaintiff' or defendant, may have testified, and subsequently became incompetent,
by the death of the opposite party. He may in the later trial use
the testimony which he had delivered when competent.
INCOMPETENCY OF WITNESS IN

ORIGINAL TRIAL

If the witness is incompetent, who delivers testimony in an
investigation, and the party to be injuriously affected by his testimony does not waive the incompetency the evidence given
will not be receivable in a later investigation. A sued the executor of B. Pending the suit, A assigned her claim to X, her son,
for whom the action proceeded. She was called by the plaintiff as
a witness before arbitrators and objected to as interested because
liable for costs. The arbitrators decided that $5o would cover all
the costs, and the plaintiff handed that amount to one of them.
She was then examined. The money was in part used in paying
the arbitrators' fee, the remainder in part payment of the expense
-of the room. Other costs were not provided for. On proof of
these facts, A's liability for costs not having been extinguished,
when she testified, her testimony was properly excluded, at the
trial before a jury.'
"Noble v. McClintock, 6 W. & S. 58. In the first trial the defendant
called S and T as witnesses. In the second trial the plaintiff put their
testimony in evidence. Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 187 Pa. 513.
2
Ballman v. Heron, 169 Pa. 510.
3
Walbridge v. Knipper, 96 Pa. 48.
4Towers v. Hagner, 3 Wh. 48.
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INCOMPETENCY ARISING SUBSFIQUENTLY

A witness may be competent when he delivers his testimony
and become incompetent by matters arising subsequently. If the
plaintiff calls B, one of three defendants, as for cross-examination,
before arbitrators, and thus makes the other co-defendants competent, and D, one of them, testifies for himself and his co-defendants, the subsequent death of B, making the plaintiff incompetent under the act of April 15th, 1869, makes it impossible for
the defendants to use at the trial the former testimony of D.
"The plaintiff ran the risk," says Agnew, J., "when he called B,
of rendering competent the other defendants, but only on the
ground that it could safely be met by the testimony of Carroll (B).
But when Carroll died, the circumstances changed." That is,
apparently, since D's testimony was admissible before the arbitrators to rebut the testimony of C, and since C. being dead
was not testifying before the jury, and since his former testimony
before the arbitrators was not being offered, neither could D testify, nor could his former testimony be used before the jury.'
DEATH OF FORMER WITNESS

The mere fact that one trial has taken place and a certain
witness has testified thereat, does not warrant the omission at a
later trial, to call this witness again, and to examine him in the
ordinary way. It is the right of the party who is to be adversely
affected by the evidence, to have it delivered anew by the witness,
in the absence of excusing circumstances. One of these circumstances is the death of the witness between the delivery of his
testimony in the earlier trial and the later trial. In any criminal
proceeding,' in any civil proceeding, says the act of May 23d, 1887,
P. L. 158 (and it thereby only expresses the common law'), when
'Allum v. Carroll, 67 Pa. 68.
2
Brown v. Com. 73 Pa. 321; Com. v. Keck, 148 Pa. 639.
3
Moore v. Pearson, 6 W. & S. 51; Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25, Cornell
v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14; Chess v. Chess, 17 S. & R. 409; Rhine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30; Jackson v. Ferris, 5 Sadler 302; Thornton v. Britton, 144

Pa. 126; Cox v. Norton, I P. & W. 412; McAdams v. Stillwell, 13 Pa. 90.
Although the death of one party renders incompetent the surviving
party, it does not appear what effect the use of the deceased party's prior
testimony woufld have upon this incompetency. Zell v. Benjamin, 1
Walk. 113.
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any person has been examined as a witness, and "such witness
afterwards die," his former testimony may be proved. The deceased witness may have been a party, and his executor or administrator may have been substituted for him. His former testimony in his own behalf may be proved by his representative'
or by the opposite party.
SUPERVENING INCOMPETENCY

A person competent when delivering his testimony, may, by
some subsequent event external to himself, be rendered incompetent to testify in any subsequent trial of the same cause. The
opposite party to the thing or contract in action may have died.
The surviving party cannot now testify, but former testimony delivered by him in the same cause, before that death, will be receivable as evidence. 2
OUT OF THE STATE

The fact that a person is before and at the trial out of the
state, so that service of a subpoena upon him to attend the trial is
impracticable, warrants the production of his testimony at a former
trial. 3 The person may be a permanent resident of this state, but
may have left a short time before the trial, on "temporary business." His family may be here. His former testimony will be
admitted." So was that of a single man who had never had a
permanent residence in Pennsylvania, as before the trial he had gone
to the city of Washington, temporarily, or "for an office," and he
was there at the trial. 5 Two years before the second trial A, who
had testified in the first, left the neighborhood, saying that he was
going to Wisconsin. It was shown that X had said that he had
received a letter from A "from a good ways in the back parts."
The reception of the former testimony was justified.' *The use of
'Evans v.: Reed, 78 Pa. 415.
-Pratt v. Patterson, 81 Pa. 114; Walbridge v. Knipper, 96 Pa. 48;
Dunlevy's Estate, 10 C. C. 454; Land Co. v. Weidner, 169 Pa. 359; Merriman v. McManus, 102 Pa. 102.
'McGill v. Kaufman, 4 S. & R. 317; Noble v. McClintock, 6 W. & S.
.58; Hocker v. Jamison, 2 W. & S. 438; Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co.,
187 Pa. 513; Beers v. Cornelius, 1 Pitts. 274.
4
Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102.
5

Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72.

'Hawk v. Greensweig, 7 Pa. LI.J. 374.
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this former testimony is warranted in criminal' as well as civil
cases.
WITNESS CANNOT BE FOUND
A person may be within the state and yet the litigants who
desires his testimony may be unable to find where he is and
to subpoena him. This will warrant the use of his testimony at
a former trial. The plaintiff offered a witness to prove that diligent efforts had been made to find X, who had testified at a former
trial, in order to serve a subpoena upon her. X was one of two
defendants in a sci fa sur mechanics' lien. Says Green, J., "if
she was absent from the trial and could not be found after diligent
search, there was no other course to pursue" than to admit the proof
of her former testimony.' The judgment of the trial court as to the
sufficiency of the effort to find and subpoena the witness, is probThe testimony of M at a
ably in the ordinary case conclusive.'
former trial being offered, objection was made that it had not
been proven that proper effort had been made to secure the attendance of the absent witness. "This," says Brown, J., "was
a matter for the court below with the proof before it of the efforts
that had been made to subpoena the witness."' The trial was
fixed for Wednesday. M had been in Mexico, Cuba and New
York for some time. He came home from New York on Monday
evening preceding the trial and was absent during the day on
Tuesday and Wednesday. Three attempts of the plaintiff to subpoena him after his return from New York failed. The plaintiff
testifies that she remained three hours at his house, waiting to
get a service of subpoena on him. The admission of his former
testimony was proper. 5 Proof was made that frequent inquiries
had been made for B, who was about 22 years of age, that he went
west in the fall, and had not returned, that he had no family.
Some of his neighbors thought that he would return by the next
'Corn. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26; Act May 23d 1887, P. L. 158.
2Ballman v. Heron, 169 Pa. 510.
3In Greenan v. Eggeling, 30 Super. 253, the court observes that
it had examined the evidence relating to the effort to serve the subpoena
on the witness, and that the action of the trial court in receiving proof
of the testimony at the former trial "is not open to objection."
'Delahunt v. United T. & T. Co., 215 Pa. 241.
5Greenman v. Eggeling, 30 Super. 253.
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spring. They did not know whether he had relatives. The
former testimony of B was properly received.' When a former
witness is in full life and within reach of the process of the court,
and has not been subpoenaed to attend, proof of his former testimony is inadmissible.'
EFFORT TO SECURE WITNESS INSUFFICIENT

When the court deems the effort to subpoena, or the subpoena having been disobeyed, to attach the witness insufficient,
it will not allow the use of.his former testimony. The sheriff was
shown to have had the attachment for a recusant witness and to
have been out on the morning of the day on which the witness's
testimony was desired, about half past five o'clock, at the witness's
office or place of business. It was stated (probably there and
to the sheriff) that the witness had gone to Philadelphia. (The
trial was at Danville, Montour County.) On evidence of these
facts, the Court properly refused to allow proof by the stenographer
of the witness's former testimony.'
WITNESS IN OTHER COUNTIES OF THE STATE

The rules of court make provisions for the use of deposition
of witnesses. These provisions vary somewhat in the rules of the
several courts. One in Indiana county provides for the taking and
use ofdepositions of witnesses who reside out of the county. Itwas
inferred by the trial court, that the fact that a witness resided in
an adjoining county, Westmoreland, justified the use of his
deposition, and if so, of his former testimony in a former trial
of the case in Indiana County. 4 Under the rules of the Allegheny county court, effort to secure by subpoena the presence of
'Covanhovan v. Hart, 21 Pa. 495. The appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision, unless the evidence before it was "palpably insufficient to excuse the non-production of the witness," says
Black, C. J.
2Huidekoperv. Cotton, 3W. 56.
'Brennan v. Jacobs, 1 Mona. 213; 22 W. N. 453. Orlady, 3., remarks
of this case, "the reason for excluding the testimony does not clearly
appear. 1 Molloy v. U. S. Express Co., 22 Super. 173.
4
Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa..203. The trial court, however, should have
required the stenographer, before reading his notes, to swear to their
accuracy.
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a witness at the trial and his testimony, is not necessary in order
to use his deposition, or his formerly delivered testimony, unless
he resides and is in the county. Hence, the witness residing in
Fayette county, when the trial occurs, his former testimony may
be proved, although no subpoena had been issued to compel his
appearance.' In Cumberland county a deposition cannot be used
if the deponent resides within the state and within 5o miles of the
place of trial, unless he has been duly subpoenaed and due diligence has been used, without success, to procure his attendance;
or it has been impossible, after reasonable pains have been taken,
to find him. Doubtless the use of former testimony in the cause
would be qualified by the same conditions.
CORPOREAL SICKNESS AND INFIRMITY

The act of May 23d, 1887, authorizes the use of his former
testimony when the witness has "become incompetent to testify
for any legally sufficient reason properly proven." Sickness and
infirmity, precluding coming to the place of trial and undergoing
examination there, is a "legally sufficient" incompetency. A
witness 73 years old was confined in bed in a hospital by reason
of infirmities and "an acute attack of illness."' Another was 87
years old and confined to his room, having palsy.' Another, a
wife, was so ill that she could not be in court. 4 Another, a
woman over 70 years old, had been in bed from general debility

for the last three days. Her memory was affected. No physician had yet been called in to attend her.5 Another was subpoenaed a week before the trial. His foot was in bad order, so
that he was unable to walk.' In all these cases the former testimony of the witness was received. The transience of the sickness
of the witness, if it exists at the time of the trial, does not induce
the court, in civil cases, either to postpone the trial or to exclude
'Green v. Hopper, 13 York 4.

A witness in any part of the state

may be subpoenaed to attend a trial in any other part in the absence
of a rule of court providing for the use of his deposition. Nace v. Col-

lege of Oratory, 46 Super. 237.
2
Molloy v. U. S. Bxpress Co., 22 Super. 173.
3Thornton v. Britton, 144 Pa. 126.
4
Perrin v. Wells, 155 Pa. 299.
5
Com. Title Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa. 255.

6

Knights of Pythias v. Leadbeter, 2 Super. 461.
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the previously delivered testimony.' The severity of the sickness
may lead to a different action of the court in criminal from what
it is in civil cases. Says Mitchell, J., if the witness, though alive
and within the jurisdiction of the court,"be old or infirm or sick,
to a degree that renders his attendance in court dangerous or unduly burdensome to himself, or impracticable for other reasons,
then his deposition may always be substituted for his bodily presence, and the determination of this question in each case as it rises
rest largely in the discretion of the court. On the trial for murder,
for instance, the judge presiding would feel it his duty to enforce
the attendance of a witness having knowledge of the crucial facts,
even at.some risk to the witness's health or life; while in a civil
action he might feel free to hold that a much smaller risk to the
witness would be sufficient to excuse him from personal attendance."'
EVIDENCE OF SICKNESS AND INFIRMITY
The evidence of incapacity to attend the trial and to be examined is sometimes that of experts, sometimes not. The sworn
certificate of a physician is sometimes received. 3 His unsworn
certificate, if conceded to be true, is enough to persuade the
court.4 A husband's testimony that his wife is too ill to be in
court' may be sufficient. The- trial judge must decide whether
the evidence justifies the reception of the former testimony.
After he has decided and allowed the testimony to be received it
is not error to refuse to hear evidence that the witness's health
was such as to permit her to attend court. 6
LOSS OF MEMORY-INSANITY
A witness may, by reason of age, disease, etc., have lost his
memory not merely of the particular transaction, but, generally,
'McLain v. Com.; 99 Pa. 86. Whether in criminal cases the court
would act different has not been decided.
'Thornton v. Britton, 144 Pa. 126.
3Knights of Pythias v. Leadbeter, 2 Super. 461. The person who
served the subpoena also testified to the illness.
4Molloy v. U. S. Express Co., 22 Super. 173.
'Perrin v. Wells, 155 Pa. 299. Testimony was offered of illness, in
Com. Title Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa. 255.
'Poundstone v. Jones, 182 Pa. 574.
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between the delivery of his former testimony and the later trial.
This would justify the use of his former testimony, even although
he were able to be and was, in fact, present in court. "We cannot see," said Mercer, J.,"any substantial reason why the testimony
of a witness once duly taken in a pending cause may not afterwards be read in evidence in another cause between the same
parties in regard to the same subject-matter, when in the interval
the witness has lost his memory by reason of old age and ill
health. The justice and propriety of receiving the evidence are
as strong as if the witness were dead, insane, out of the jurisdiction of the court, or unable to attend by reason of sickness.
Although bodily present, yet, if shown to have become so bereft
of memory by senility or sickness that he is unable to recall a past
transaction to which he had once testified, and has forgotten that
he ever testified in regard to it, he may be considered as practically absent."' A witness for the defendant having testified, the
defendant alleging that his memory had failed by reason of age
and infirmity, offered to read his deposition taken two years before. Lowrie, J., said he was not clear that the deposition might
not have been read.' The insanity of the witness, occurring since
the delivery of his testimony, would justify the employment of
that testimony.3
WHERE THE FORMER TESTIMONY WAS DELIVERED

The testimony which it is desired to use may have been furnished in a former trial before a jury of the same suit, whether
the second trial has been caused by a non-suit of the plaintiff,
which is subsequently taken off,' or by the award of a new trial,
'Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108. The witness was 87 years old.
In consequence of his age and ill health, although he was present in
court and was examined as a witness, he could not remember that he
had testified concerning a certain memorandum book. His former testimony was received.

2
Jack v. Woods, 29 Pa. 375. Its exclusion by the trial court did no
harm, because the evidence was irrelevant.

'Shannon v. Castner, 21 Super. 294. The witness being in court,
but found to be non-composmentis, his deposition previously taken was

admitted.
4Molloy v. U. S. Express Co., 22 Super. 173; Rothrock v. Gallaher,
91 Pa. 108.
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after a verdict of the first jury, either by the trial court' or by the
appellate court.' The cause may have been referred to arbitrators,
from whose award there may have been an appeal to the court,
and the former testimony may have been delivered before the arbitrators.3 The rule to arbitrate may, after the choice of arbitrators, but before any award has been filed by them, be struck
off. Nevertheless, the testimony taken before them may be used
in the subsequent trial of the cause before a jury.4 The tribunal
before which the testimony was delivered must have had jurisdiction, in order to make that testimony receivable in a later trial,
but if a submission to arbitrators is erroneously set aside on the
ground that it was merely null, the testimony taken before them
is not made incapable of use in a later trial by such mistaken
setting aside of the submission. 5 Apparently, without the authority of any statute, the parties to a controversy may agree to
refer it to arbitrators6 and testimony taken before them could be
used in a future trial.' A suit on assumpsit may be discontinued
after a verdict, which is set aside and another suit brought for the
same cause. The testimony delivered in the first may be employed in the second.' So, when there were two ejectments
between the same parties for the same land.' Testimony taken
in an issue devisavit vel non, might be used in an ejectment involving the same will."0 Evidence taken to support the application
for an issue devisavit vel non, before examiners appointed by the
orphans' court, may be employed in the trial of the issue in the
'Delahunt v. T. & T. Co., 215 Pa. 241; Greenan v. Eggeling, 30
Super. 253.
2
Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 187 Pa. 513; Perrin v. Wells, 155
Pa. 299; Knights of Pythias v. Leadbeter, 2 Super. 461; Smith v. Hine,
179 Pa. 203; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26.
3
R. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. 300; Jackson v. Ferris, 5 Sadler 302;
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 23 P'a. 72; Com. v. Norton, 1 P. & W. 412; Covanhovan v. Hart, 21 Pa. 495; Walbridge v. Knipper, 96 Pa. 48; Hepler v.
Mt. Carmel Savings Bank, 97 Pa. 400.
4
Zell v. Benjamiin, 1 Walk. 113.
5
McAdams' Exec. v. Stilwell, 13 Pa. 90.
'Gallup v. Reynolds, 8 W. 424.
7
McAdams' Exec. v. Stilwell, 13 Pa. 90.
8
Pratt v. Patterson, 81 Pa. 114.
ORhine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30; Moore v. Pearson, 6 W. & S. 51.
"0 Lightner v. Wike, 4 S. & R. 203.
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common pleas.' A petition of the administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. of X
to the orphans' court to compel the administrators of Y, who
had been executor of X, to file Y's account, as executor, was
dismissed. Some years after the petition was renewed. The testiDeposimony taken in the first was receivable in the second.'
tions taken in support of an application to open a judgment, may
be used in the subsequent trial of the issue after the judgment has
been opened. 3 Testimony delivered by A in a suit by A v. B
may be used, B dying, in supporting his claim in the orphans'
court." The first action is account render. The verdict is for
the plaintiff. A new trial is granted because the court thought
the action should have been assumpsit. The form of action was
then changed to assumpsit. The testimony at the first trial was
receivable at the second.5 A bill in equity to have a deed declared void. In a subsequent ejectment for the land embraced
in the deed, between a grantee in this deed and persons claiming
adversely to it, testimony given under the bill is receivable.'
1
Com.
2

Title Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa. 255.
Graham's Estate, 12 Dist. 415.
3
Haupt v. Henninger, 37 Pa. 138.
'Dunlevy's Estate, 10 C. C. 454.
5
Evans v. Reed, 78 Pa. 415.
6
Eckman v. Eckman, 68 Pa. 460.
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MOOT-COURT
DARON

v. FENTON

Shooting Trespassing Chickens
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Daron's chickens repeatedly trespassed upon Fenton's fields,
scratching out his seed corn as fast as it could be planted, eating the
young wheat and oats and doing other damage. After driving them
off many times and asking Daron to pen them up, Fenton shot ten of
them. This is trespass for the value of the chickens shot.
Glauser for Plaintiff.
Means for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
FERRIO, J.-This case presents the interesting question; whether
defendant, having given plaintiff notice to pen up chickens, was justified in killing them.
By settled principles of English law the degree of force, which may
be employed in defending one's person or property when present, is well
defined and admits of no controversy. If a man makes an assault on
person of another, or enters his house and refuses to go out when ordered, or enters on his land, or in any way attempts a mere trespass on
his property, real or personal, by force, so much force as is necessary
to repel or prevent injury or remove tresspasser may be employed.
There is no doubt that if A is trespassing on land of B, the latter may,
after notice to depart, use such reasonable force as is necessary for his
removal. He may use like force to expel another's beast from his land,
or he may seize and impound it. But he has no right by the English
law or our own, in such a case, to destroy life or inflict permanent injury, or use greater force than is necessary for removal or prevention of
damage. This view is supported in 2 A. & ],. Cyc. 358 and 3 Cyc. 399.
It is well settled law in Pennsylvania that the owner of domestic
animals is liable in trespass for damages committed by them in trespassing. Barber v. Mensch, 157 Pa. 380; Arthurs v. Chatfield, 9 Pa.
Co. Ct. 34; Zeigler v. House, 1 Pa. Dist. 609. TheAct of April 4, 1889, controls the subject. It left rights of landowners and cattlemen as at
common law, and the owner of cattle must fence them in, and is liable
for damages to his neighbor's crops by his cattle.
In the case of Clark v Kelcher, 107 Mass. 136, one of the leading
cases on the subject and one almost in point with the one at bar, defendant
was held liable for killing chickens even after he had given notice to
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owner of chickens to keep them penned. The same view was taken in
Johnson V. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, where chickens were poisoned after
notice to keep them out of defendant's land. Court said, in Clark v.
Kelcher case, 107 Mass. 136, that act of killing plaintiff's hens was without legal justification. It is admitted landowner has no right to kill
his neighbor's cattle when found trespassing, but must content himself
with legal remedies of impounding or bringing suit at law. The destruction of valuable property is not necessary to protection of his
rights, and this rule applies as well to feathered animals not ferae
naturae as to larger and more valuable animals. Animals fully reclaimed
and used for burden, husbandry or fo6d are property of intrinsic value
and as such under legal protection.
Prevention of intrusion on property is one of rights essential to
it, and every proprietor is allowed to use force which is absolutely
necessary to vindicate. If he uses more than is absolutely necessary
he renders himself responsible for all consequences. Defendant here
plainly used unnecessary force and should not hake resorted to such extreme measures as he had legal remedy. If fowls may be shot, so may
horses, oxen and other valuable animals which will sometimes stray
into a neighbor's field, notwithstanding the prudent vigilance of their
owner. Such a rule would surely work injustice. We cannot justify
in any way the act of the defendant in taking such extreme measures,
therefore we give judgment in favor of the plaintiff for value of chickens
shot.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Daron s chickens repeatedly entered Fenton's fields, scratching up
and eating the wheat and oats. Fenton drove them off many times, and
often asked Daron to confine them. Daron did not confine them, and
they again trespassed on Fenton's fields. He shot them.
The owner of chickens has no right to make his neighbor's field a
feeding ground for them. Their acts were trespasses. What remedy
had Fenton? He could drive the chickens away. This he had done, but
they came back. Was he to stand on guard from hour to hour and day
to day? His time was too valuable for that. Surely his neighbor has
no right to impose this necessity upon him.
Was he to supinely suffer the repetition of the trespasses and resort
to his action for damages? But the damage occasioned by each trespass
would be inappreciable and an action for one such trespass would meet
with the impatient contempt of the trial judge and the hilarious ridicule of the jury. Must he wait till a large number of trespasses and
their attendant injuries have been committed and sue in one action for
them all? Some technically-minded judge would tell him that the
Or, if he
trespasses were distinct and must be sued for separately.
anescaped this check, he might find that the owner of the trespassing
him
against
judgment
a
of
recovery
the
that
so
imals was insolvent,
would be of insignificant benefit.
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A man should not be an annoyance and a nuisance to his neighbor,
and if he allows animals belonging to him to become such a nuisance,
the Courts should not look with too partial an eye upon the loss which
the sufferer's attempt at self-defense has occasioned, nor be too ready
to inflict damages upon him, in behalf of the provoking and unsocial
causer of his inconvenience.
The only effectual remedy in many cases would be the death or disablement otherwise of the offending animal. The sulky and disobliging owner, who has sought the advantages of possession of it without
caring for the vexation and loss which he is causing to his neighbor,
should meet with scant sympathy from courts or juries.
Fenton was warranted in thinking that the trespasses on his fields
were destined to continue, constantly augmenting his damages. We
cannot bring ourselves to the decision that if he resorted to the only
practicable method for averting the series of wrongs, viz.: that of disabling the fowls, he would expose himself to an action by their owner
for their value.
In reaching this result, we are not in accord with the decisions of
several Courts. A case very similar to this is presented by Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1. The provocation was the same. Instead
of shooting the offending chickens, they were killed by poisoned meal.
The defendant had warned their owner of their trespassings and had
informed him that he was going to spread the arsenated meal upon his
fields. The Court nevertheless held the defendant liable in damages.
This case is followed in Clark v. Keliher, 107 Mass. 406. There are other
cases more or less like these, cited in Ingham on the Law of Animals,
p. 135.
Of a different tenor is King v. Kline, 6 Pa. 318. A slut belonging
to Kline had trespasse.d on King's premises and stolen fish from a wall,
where it had been hung to dry. A few hours later the animal again entered King's grounds for the purpose of plunder, and was engaged
therein, when he was caught in a trap and shot. Coulter, J., remarks,
the defendant "had the right to protect and preserve that convenient
use of his property. * * * It was lawful for him to preserve [his
property, whether meat or fish] against any man's dog; and, if he could
not otherwise protect it. he might kill the dog when caught on his
premises in the act of destruction." He asks "are such animals to be
chartered for the annoyance and discomfort of people? * * * A dog
is not to be kept for the purpose of destroying the property of his
neighbors."
We are unable to see a distinction between a trespassing and thieving dog and a trespassing and thieving chicken. If, in order to
prevent an indefinite number of invasions of his close, and of depredations, King had a right to kill the dog during one of these forays, so,
we think had Fenton to kill Daron's chickens, while they were in his
field, engaged in picking up and eating the wheat and oats.
We regret that we have been constrained to reach a different result
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from that to which the able discussion of the learned trial judge has led
him.
Judgment reversed.

LOGAN v.

COAL COMPANY

Subsidence Caused by Mining
STATBZMENT OF FACTS
Logan owned land under which defendants had taken out the coal.
A subsidence having occurred, Logan sued the coal company. The
Court told the jury if they find the injury to be permanent, the measure
of damages is to be the depreciation in the value of the property due,
first, to past subsidences and, secondly, to the danger of future subsidences due to the failure to support properly the ground that has not
yet -subsided.
Kolb for Plaintiff.
Rowley for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
VOORHIS, J.-The error assigned is the charge of the Court as to
the measure of damages. That part of the charge which dealt with the
measure of damages for past subsidences we think was correctly given.
There are two late supreme court decisions which practically settle that
point. Berwine-White Coal Co. v. Weaver, 216 Pa. 195, and Rabe v.
Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252, state that the measure of damages
for permanent and irremedial injuries to land caused by failure to support the surface is the actual loss in the depreciation of the value thereof. The permanence of the injury is the test for the application of the
rule.
The second part of the charge, the part that was argued before this
Court, which instructs the jtfry to give damages for the danger of future subsidences due to the failure to support properly the ground that
has not yet subsided is the part over which the controversy has
arisen in this appeal. We think we can settle that question by a discussion of two late and important supreme court decisions.
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, is a case that has caused considerable discussion among the legal profession in Pa. It was a case arising
from the failure to properly support the surface. The land caved in
and the owner brought suit to recover damages for the subsidence. On
appeal, the supreme court held that the surface owner's right of action
dated from the time insufficient support was given the surface and not
from the date of the subsidence. It also said that damages could not
be computed until the subsidence occurred. As the law stood at that time
a man's land might subside 10 years after his cause of action arose and
thus he would have no redress. The latest case on the subject, however,
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repudiates that theory and attempts to harmonize the two cases. This
case, which is Wood v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 230 Pa. 195, states that a
man has a right of action as soon as the support under his ground is not
sufficient. In distinguishing the two cases the Court says that in
Noonan v. Pardee the action was to recover for a subsidence for a lot
of ground and the consequent injury to the hotise erected thereon, not
for failure to provide sufficient surface support as mining progressed.
What was there being considered, was whether the right of action in
such a case passed to one who acquired the surface after the failure to
provide the support had occurred, for the recovery of damages for the
specific injury resulting from a subsidence during his ownership. Bearing in mind that the action there was for a specific injury occasioned
by actual subsidence and not for failure by the owner of the under-surface to provide support, the language used to the effect that at the date
of the plaintiff's deed the damage complained of was not susceptible of
computation and only became so after the subsidence had occurred, it
becomes clear that the reference is to the damages which resulted from
the specific subsidence as a thing apart, and yet a consequence of, failure
to provide adequate surface support. Whether the plaintiff in that case
ever had a right of action for failure to support was left doubtful on the
facts. It is nowhere suggested in the opinion in that case that the damages resulting from the failure to provide surface support are not susceptible of computation until mining has ceased and that, therefore, the
right of action must be so long suspended, or that it is suspended until
a subsidence has occurred.
In Wood v. Pittsburg Coal Co., the case was left before the court
upon a petition in equity bv the plaintiff to have the defendant enjoined
from further mining as his, the plaintiff's, surface land was already endangered by improper support, and if the mining progressed would probably subside. The court dismissed the petition on the grounds that
the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law for damages.
If surface owner has an action as soon as the support becomes insufficient, he is entitled to damages. It is the duty of the jury to assess
these damages, and we do not think it is error for the jury to be told
that they are to take into consideration the depreciation in value of the
property due to the lack of support. What else could the jury consider?
This seems to be their only guide.
Under the law at present in Pa., we do not think the trial judge
committed error in charging the jury in reference to damages for the
danger of future subsidences. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal of the
defendant below.
OPINION OP SUPREME COURT
Subsidences having occurred, the damages occasioned by them are
measurable by two alternative rules. If the injury is corrigible at an
expense less than the sum of money which measures the depreciation
caused to the market value of the premises, that expense will be the
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damages allowable. If the injury is "permanent," that is, is irremovable by an outlay of money which shall be less than the depreciation,
then the depreciation will furnish the standard of damages. Berkey v.
Berwind-White C. M. Co., 229 Pa. 417; Weaver v. Berwind-White Co.,
216 Pa. 195; Woods v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 230 Pa. 197. This rule, however, was rejected by Dean, J., in Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, when
he observes, "the difference in the market value before and after the
injury in this class of cases is not the truerule." Stewart, J., attempts
to explain this remark by saying, that "it does not rule that it [the difference of values before and after the subsidence] is not the measure of damages where the suit is for failure to support." This is a misapprehension of the decision. Dean, J., distinctly says that the mine-owner or
operator commits the actionable tort, not when a subsidence occurs,
but when he removes the coal without leaving sufficient support and he
allows no suit even for the subsidence, if, when the action is brought
more than six years have elapsed since the removal, although less than
six years have elapsed since the subsidence. The only function of the
subsidence is to "fix" the right to sue, and to furnish a standard for
the admeasurement of damages. We shall ignore Noonan v. Pardee,
and adhere to the measure of damages stated in the other cases. No
error was committed, therefore, by the Court below in holding that the
"permanent" injury from the subsidence was measured by the difference between the market value of the premises as they were before the
subsidence, and as they were after.
Doubtless, had the plaintiff insisted, this statement of the rule
should have been modified. Even before the subsidence, the market
value of the premises would not have been as great after the excavation
of the coal without leaving supports as it was before, and surely the
depreciatory effects on the selling capacity of the surface of this excavation should enter into the computation of damages.
The Court has allowed damages not only for past subsidences, but
also for apprehensible future subsidences. In Noonan v. Pardee, it is
indicated that while the removal of the supports is a cause of action, an
action cannot be sustained upon it, until there has been a subsidence
in consequence. This view is rejected by Stewart, J., in Woods v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 230 Pa., 197, who holds, apparently, that for the mere
ablation of support, a suit can be brought and damages recovered, as a
suit may also be brought for the subsidence. He intimates also that
the damages for the latter will not, while the damages for the former
may, be the difference between market values. Respecting an excavation under 40 acres, Stewart, J., says, "The injury to the40 acres if [they
are] endangered, is complete in itself, without regard to what the defendants may or may not hereafter do, and the plaintiff is entitled at
once [though there has been no subsidence] to receive such damages as
are proper to remunerate him for the injury he has sustained." He intimates below that the difference of values would be the measure of the
remuneration. There is no suggestion that the cost of replacing the
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pillars might in any case be the measure, and since there had been no
changes of the surface, the reparableness of such changes could not be
relevant.
It is an interesting question whether, were an action brought for
the excavation, before any caving in, and the difference of market
value was recovered, there could, after the caving in, be another action
and another recovery of damages. It would be diffioult to concede that
the second action would be tolerated.
It is always possible for the mine-operator who has neglected to
furnish supports to amend his neglect by furnishing them. This possibility will not, however, we opine, prevent the assumption that he
will not thus amend his neglect, and that the consequent injury to the
selling value of the superjacent land is permanent.
Much of what appears in Woods v. Pittsburg Coal Co. supra, is dictum. The bill in equity might have been dismissed on the ground that,
if any cave-in should occur, there would be an adequate remedy at law
for damages, so that a remedy in equity would be unnecessary. It was
not necessary, in order to justify the dismissal of the bill to hold that
an action at law would lie before there should be a sinking of the surface. That there would be such an action seems to be assumed, though
the assumption is in contradiction of Dean, J., in Noonan v. Pardee,
and we shall follow the later opinion. There is always higher wisdom
in the later than in the earlier of any series of judgments. Prior
[opinio] in tempore, posteriorin sapientia.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH

V.

ROGERS

Law Making Insanity no Defense-Constitutionality

of

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On trial of Rogers for murder, the Court refused to permit the introduction of evidence that Rogers was insane at time of murder. A
statute provided that insanity shall not be a defense to a charge of
homicide.
Wallace for Prosecution.
Westover for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DORN, J.-A violation of constitutional restraints and prohibitions
is the only permissible ground for calling upon the courts to determine
the validity of a statute, and the unwisdom, impracticableness, unreasonableness, or injustice of the enactment furnishes no ground for interposition.
The question to be decided in this case is, whether the evidence that
the defendant was insane at the time of the murder was properly re-
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jected by the Court below, and in arriving at the determination of this
question, it is necessary to look toward the constitutionality of the act,
which prohibits insanity as a defense to a charge of homicide.
The fourteenth article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States provides that "no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." There has been
considerable discussion regarding the meaning of the phrase, "due process of law." Judge Story says: "When life and liberty are in question,
there must in every instance be judicial proceedings, and that requirement implies an accusation, a hearing before an impartial tribunal, with
proper jurisdiction, etc." In general, whatever the state establishes will
be due process of law, so that it be general and impartial in operation,
and disregard no provision of Federal or State Constitution. When,
therefore, a statute provides that insanity shall not be a defense in
homicide cases, one who desires to avail himself of that defense, and is
refused, does not receive a "hearing" in the true sense of the word, nor
is it possible, with such a statute in force, to obtain due process of law.
Every man has the unquestionable right to set up as a defense that
which he believes to be most suitable to his particular case.
A person is not criminally responsible for an act committed when
he was so insane from defect or disease of the mind, as to be incapable
of understanding the nature and quality of the act, or of distinguishing
between right and wrong, either generally, or with respect to the particular act, or according to some of the decisions, as to be irresistibly
impelled to the commission of the act. 22 Cyc. 1213. Counsel for defendant has said that this act blocks the avenue of escape of criminals
desiring to avail themselves of the defense of insanity. It would be
very difficult, indeed, for a person to escape by means of the defense of
insanity, were he really not insane. Our laws provide for the appointment of commissions to inquire into the mental state of the accused, and
fox" the testimony of expert witnesses, through whose aid the jury may
easily determine the question of insanity.
So far as I have been able to find, there is no state in the Union
which does not recognize the defense of insanity in a case such as this.
In Pennsylvania, the cases are too numerous to mention, where evidence
of insanity in murder trials has been allowed. Among the leading cases
are: Commonwealth v. Baccieri, 153 Pa. 535; Commonwealth v. Gearhardt, 205 Pa. 387; Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138; Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 109Pa. 262, and Commonwealth v. Cressinger, 193 Pa. 326.
Some courts have even held that if the accused becomes insane
during the trial, the proceedings must stop. Youtsey v. United States,
97 U. S. 937; Kinloch's Case, 18 Hon. 395, and if he becomes insane after
conviction, judgment cannot be given or sentence pronounced so long
as he is in such condition. People v. Farrell, 31 Cal. 576.
It is proper to allow considerable latitude in the testimony taken to
prove insanity. The prior insanity of the accused and his prior mental
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condition, not too remote in point of time, arealways relevant. Wheeler
v. State, 34 Ohio 394; 86 N. W. 596, and in 12 Cyc. 403.
The admissibility of evidence in actions by or against insane persons
or their representatives is governed by the same rules that apply in civil
actions generally. 22 Cyc. 124; Lancaster County Nat'l. Bank v. Moore,
78 Pa. 407.
In all of the definitions which I have been able to find, the word
"intent" appears. This Court finds it impossible to conceive of a murder without the necessary intent. A person deprived of his faculties
can certainly not be said to have intentionally killed another, and, as
this intent is a necessary element in orderto convict, this Court is of the
opinion that a statute which deprives a person of the right to show that
he was unable to entertain such intent is unconstitutional and void.
The evidence should have been admitted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
That insanity of the doer of an act which, if done by a sane person,
will be a crime, prevents its being a crime, at common law is too evident
to need discussion. The jurisprudence of Europe and of civilized
America has constantly recognized this principle.
But the principle has been made by the law-making authorities of
the different countries. The power of making principles has not departed from these countries. They have Legislatures whose function
is, not merely to make laws for fields of action not heretofore covered
by laws, but to repeal or change laws however venerable, and supported
by however wide a consensus of jurisconsults, statesmen and judges.
The only question presented in the case is, whether the state can
penalize an act when committed by an insane man, exactly as it penalizes such act when it is committed by a sane man, that is, can it alter
the definition of murder or other crime so as to make the crime not to
include the mental states, which in the aggregate are called soundness of
mind.
It matters little, in what form the state does this. It might exact
that hereafter the acts which, done by a sane man, shall constitute
murder, shall be deemed to be murder when done by an insane man.
The effect of such an enactment would be to make investigation into
sanity purposeless and irrelevant.
The state again might say, that in all trials for murder, no inquiry
should be allowed concerning the sanity of the defendant. That would
indirectly eliminate the mental state of the accused from the definition
of the crime.
As we conceive the question, it is simply this: May the state adopt
the policy of treating in the same way killers of men who are insane as
those who are sane? May it also investigate the killing in the case of
the insane, precisely as in the case of the sane, by the machinery of a
grand and petit jury,of an indictment, plea, delivery of testimony, in open
court, etc.: may it put the same name on the killing by an insane, as
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upon the killing a sane man, calling it by a name, murder, that heretofore has been applicable only to acts of the sane?
The question, so far as we know, has been but once considered. The
state of Washington has enacted that "it shall be no defense to a person
charged with the commission of a crime that at the time of its commission, he was unable, by reason of his insanity, idiocy or imbecility,
to comprehend the nature and quality of the act committed, or to understand that it was wrong," etc. The Supreme Court of the state decided
the act unconstitutional, but for reasons distressingly wanting in clearness. The leading opinion condemns the act as impairing the right of
trial by jury, and in so doing, unwittingly commits itself to the absurd
proposition that legislation cannot simplify the definition of crime,
make certain elements of it heretofore necessary to its completeness hereafter unnecessary, without trenching on the jury-trial-right. We shall
not waste our time in attempting to expose the preposterousness of such
a position. One example will suffice. An act, let us suppose, has made
permissible the sale of liquor to a minor, with knowledge of his minority.
Under such an act, the accused may defend on the ground that the buyer
from him was not a minor, but adult, or that if a minor, he was ignorant
of his minority. He may also deny the selling. Let us now suppose an
act to be passed to the effect that ignorance of the minority shall no
longer be a defense. The effect is that evidence by the defendant of
his ignorance must be excluded because irrelevant. This would, says
the learned Court, because it reduces the number of facts which must
be found by the jury in order to convict, impairs the right of-trial by
jury. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106; 110 Pac. 1020. Pages are consumed in this case in showing that heretofore the sanity of the agent
has been one of the ingredients of crimes committed by him, a matter
not disputed and not relevant, the only question being whether the law
making authority of a state has lost the power of re-defining crime, so
as to omit the mental state of the doer from the definition.
Insane persons may be kept in confinement in asylums even when
they are not pronounced criminals. The asylum may be not a whit
more eligible than a so-called penitentiary as a place of abode. The object of "punishment" may be, to correct the criminal; to deter others
from committing crimes, as well as to punish. It does not appear that
the insane may not be improved by discipline, or that others seeing
them "=punished," but not knowing that they were insane, might
not be deterred from imitating them. If a state chooses to relinquish
the "punishment" of persons, and to adopt merely the methods of reform
or warning, we know nothing that hinders it. We see no sound reason
for its not applying the same methods of repression to acts alike of the
insane and of the sane.
Tle "crime" for which the accused is on trial is murder. We are
not to assume that the punishment of murder is death. Perhaps the
State in eliminating insanity as a defense is doing so because, the
criminal code being ameliorated and humanized, there really remains no
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good reason fortreating the insane "criminal" differently from the sane.
But let us suppose that death is still the punishment for murder,
when committed by the insane as well as by the sane. What hinders,
if a civilized people, the people of Pennsylvania, for instance, choose to
end the life of a man-killer, irrespectively of his menfal state? He is
dangerous. He must be confined. Is a life-long confinement more
humane than death? Who is to decide? Shall the people, speaking
through their legislature, or shall five or seven lawyers?
The only constitutional pretext for the nullification of the chosen
policy of the people, of which we are aware, is the presence in the 14th
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, of the provision
that no State shall deprive any person of life, etc., without due process
of law. This phrase is incapable of definition, and is simply a charter to
the judges to override the will of the people whenever they happen to
have strong repugnance to a piece of legislation. Not being possessed
of this strong repugnance, we feel no impulse'to defeat the will of the
people who have elevated us to the bench, by annulling their legislative action.
There is a provision in the state constitution that cruel punishment shall not be inflicted. But this provision has been found compatible with the imposition of terrible punishments, even capital, upon
crimes against property. We have suggested that a euthanasia is better
than a long imprisonment, and yet such imprisonment would be the
fate of a homicidal maniac or paranoiac, were death not provided.
The provision against cruel punishment does not apply to lunatics,
so long as they are not treated as criminals. They can be poisoned,
asphyxiated, drowned, as the State may choose, so far as the clause of
the bill of rights is concerned. To call their acts "crimes" and the consequences thereof to themselves "punishments" would hardly justify
the holding that applying the same punishments to the insane as to the
sane would be to inflict cruel or unusual punishment.
Modern penologists and psychologists have failed to see a sharp
clear line of distinction between the so-called insane who do injurious
acts and the so-called criminals. There is a want of self-control, a
morbid impulsiveness, a want of capacity to foresee and keep in vivid anticipation the legal or natural consequences of deeds in both classes.
It may be that death or long imprisonments with solitary confinement,
and the other incidents of penalization as heretofore practiced, should
in all cases be abrogated. We are not convinced that the treatment of
the insane "criminals" and of the sane should proceed upon divergent
lines.
At all events we find no warrant in the Constitution of the State,
or of the United States, for saying that the legislation in question is
void.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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GEORGE ACKERS v. SAMUEL SIDDONS
Slander-Proof of Reputation of Being a Chicken Thief

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit for slander in stating to two persons that Ackers was a chicken
thief. Siddons by plea denied the utterance of the words, but also pleaded that Ackers was in fact a chicken thief. He offered to prove that
Ackers had the reputation widely of being a chicken thief. The court
rejected the offer.
O'Rorke for Plaintiff.
Sohn for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
KOLB, J.-By denying the utterance of the alleged slanderous words
the defendant pleaded "not guilty" and at the same time joined with it
the plea of "justification" by offering to prove that Ackers' reputation
was widely that of a chicken thief.
Under modern practice the pleas of "not guilty" and "justification"
may be pleaded together, as not being inconsistent. The defendant
may believe and allege that he never used the words imputed to him,
but as human testimony is fallible and uncertain, he may well fortify
himself by adding, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving that I did say the
words, they were untrue. It may be the only safe line of defense.
Peters v. Ulmer, 74 Pa. 402; Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa. 393; Ferber v. Gazette
Pub. Co., 212 Pa. 367.
The next question to be considered is regarding the admissibility
of proving Ackers' reputation as being that of a chicken thief.
It is eminently sound and proper that a reputation already damaged
in the very point in controversy, is not so valuable, commercially speaking, as a reputation which is unspotted; therefore there is no more
reason why a damaged reputation should command the same price as
an unsullied one.
It is well settled by the authorities that in an action for slander, the
defendant may show, in mitigation of damages, the general bad character of plaintiff for the particular thing with which he is charged.
This principle is distinctly asserted in Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa. 393;
Smith v. Buckecker et ux, 4 Rawle 297; 47 Pa. 198; 49 Pa. 210.
Phillips on Evidence says that the defendant may give in evidence
the plaintiff's general bad character in mitigation of damages, but according to Snowden v. Smith, that such evidence is not admissible when
defendant republishes the slander by his plea, and puts the truth of the
words in issue. In Long v. Brougher, 5 Watts, 439, the defendant was
not permitted to give in evidence that the plaintiff admitted to witnesses
that he had been guilty of a similar offense to that imputed to him; nor
to give in evidence that it was generally reported in the county for
many years that the defendant had been guilty of the same kind of offense as that charged against him. 6 Penna. 170.
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We think the learned court below rightly rejected the offer.
Affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below has properly held that the plea of justification, that is, that the plaintiff committed the act imputed to him by
the alleged defamation, does not preclude proof of the blemished reputation of the plaintiff, if the plea of "not guilty" is also on the record.
Both pleas are present in the case before us.
What is the reputation of the plaintiff which the defendant offers
to show? The learned court below seems to take it to be, the reputation of having committed the same act with which the defendant has
charged him. In Long v. Brougher, 5 W. 439, the evidence which was
offered and which was, in Gibson, C. J.'s, opinion, properly rejected,
was that before the slander of the defendant, reports were in circulation
that the plaintiff had been guilty (not of crimes similar to the one imputed, but), of "the crimementioned," i.e. by the defendant. Cf. 1 Wigmore Evid. 154, where this interpretation is put upon the case. Wigmore agrees with Gibson, C. J., that. the "better arguments" require
the exclusion of such evidence.
The charge made by Siddons was not that Ackers stole a particular
chicken, or particular chickens, but that he was a chicken thief. The
offer of defendant was to show that Ackers had a wide reputation
of being a "chicken thief." If the charge had been that Ackers had
stolen a chicken, it would have been proper to allow Siddons to prove
that he had the reputation of being a thief. Droun v. Allen, 91 Pa. 393.
When the charge is general, as to a trait of character, evidence of
the reputation of the plaintiff concerning this trait is receivable. In
Conroe v. Conroe, 47 Pa. 198, the charge was not that the female plaintiff had committed an act of adultery, but that she was a whore. It was
held that defendant might prove that her reputation for chastity was
bad.
The object of the plaintiff's action is to recover compensation for
the lessening of his good reputation for honesty in respect to the property of others; in particular, in respect to the chickens of others. We
think it entirely proper to show that his reputation in regard to this had
already been impaired.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

COMMONWEALTH v. WHITEMAN
Indictment-Burden of Proving Duress

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was indicted for robbery. The defense was duress.
The only question in the case is whether or not the trial judge erred in
his charge to the jury. The Court charged the jury that the burden
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was on the defendant to prove the duress by a fair preponderance of the
evidence.
Storey for Prosecution.
Myers for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
BURD, J.-The counsel for the defendant contends that the court
should have charged the jury that if they had a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the defendant acted under duress when he committed the
crime, they should acquit.
With the exception of a prosecution for murder, duress is a good
defense to any criminal prosecution, where the criminal act is done on
demand of another under pain of instant death, should compliance with
the demand be refused, Clark's Criminal Law, p 90, 10 Amer. & Eng.
Enc. 346. In the present case we may assume that the duress, if proven,
was such as would have constituted a good defense.
'We know of no cases where duress has been set up as a defense to
a crime, in which the question of the weight of proof of such defense
was brought into question, but there are numerous decisions where insanity and self-defense have been set up as defenses. In these cases
there is abundant authority to sustain the charge of the trial judge,
while the contention of the counsel for the defendant is supported by
authorities no less weighty or abundant.
In cases where insanity has been set up as a defense some of the
courts hold that if the jury have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
insanity they must acquit, Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159; People v.
McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 352; State v. Bartlett, 43
N. H. 224; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; Dennis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 489.
In the last-mentioned case Justice Harlan in a well-reasoned opinion,
speaking for the Court, said, "How then, on principle, can a verdict of
guilty be returned if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to the
existence of a fact iwhich is essential to guilt, namely, the capacity in
law of the accused to commit the crime."
In cases where self-defense has been set up as a defense, several
jurisdictions have held that if the jury have a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense they must acquit.
People v. Roirden, 117 N. Y. 71; Tweedy v. State, S Ia. 433; State v.
Dillon, 74 Ia. 643; Brown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666.
It is a fundamental principle of law that every man is innocent until
proven guilty, and that the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "Robbery is the felonious
and forcible taking of goods or money to any value, from the person by
violence or putting him in fear." 4 B1, Com. 242. Trickett on Crimes,
Vol. II, p. 662 says, "there must be a felonious intent; whatever that
means; probably an intent to use violence as a measure of obtaining
possession of the victim's personal property and permanently depriving
him thereof." If, then, the defendant, Whiteman, acted under duress,
he did not have the felonious intent, one of the constituent elements of
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the crime of robbery. If the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether
or not the defendant acted under duress, then they must have had a
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the felonious intent. If they
have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant had the
felonious intent, one of the constituent and necessary elements of the
crime of robbery, then they must have a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt and must acquit. Such a charge, it seems to the Court, would be
more in accord with sound reason and logic and more in harmony with
the humane principle, which in "favorem vitae" requires the guilt of the
accused to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Such would be
our decision if the principles of law in'folved in this case had not already
been decided in this State.
In a long line of decisions, extending from Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 414, to Commonwealth v. Lee, 233 Pa. 16, it has been uniformely held that when the defendant sets up insanity as a defense, he
must prove it by a fair preponderance of evidence.
The Act of Mar. 31, 1860, sec. 66, provides: In every case in which
it shall be given in evidence on trial of any person charged with any
crime or misdemeanor that such person was insane at time of commission of such offense, and he shall be acquitted, the jury shall be required
to find specially whether such person was insane at the time of commission (f such offense, and declare whether he was acquitted by them on
the ground of such insanity." In view of this statute-we can readily
understand why courts require the defendant to prove his insanity by
a fair preponderance of evidence, but the Penna. courts apparently
adopt this charge independent of statute, for in many of the cases so
decided the statute is not mentioned. Such was also the doctrine laid
down in the English courts. In Regina v. Stokes. 3 Carr & K., a case
of murder, Baron Rolfe said, "If the prisoner seek to excuse himself on
the ground of insanity, it is for him to make it clear that he was insane
at the time of commiting the offense charged. The onus rests on him,
and the jury must be satisfied that he was actually insane. If the
matter is left in doubt, it will be their duty to convict; for every man
must be presumed to be responsible for his acts until the contrary is
shown."
In the case of Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, where the defense
of self-defense was set up to a criminal prosecution, Agnew, J., said,
"As to whether a reasonable doubt shall establish the plea of self-defense,
I take the law to be this: If there is a reasonable doubt that any offense
has been committed by the prisoner, it operates to acquit. But if the
evidence clearly establishes the killing by the prisoner purposely with
a deadly weapon, then an illegal homicide is established, and the burden
falls on the prisoner, not the Commonwealth, to show that is was excusable as self-defense. If then his evidence leave this extenuation in
doubt, he cannot be acquitted." In Commonwealth v. Feruchi, 219 Pa.
155, the Court said, "Where the defendant sets up self-defense and under.
takes to establish his excuse, the evidence relied on, whether it come
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from his side or the Commonwealth, must, when weighed show by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, the extenuation sought to be established
in order to acquit." To the same effect is Com. v. Palmer, 222 Pa, 229.
In Com. v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, Moschzisker, J. said, "There was no
error in saying that the burden of proving self-defense was on the
defendant and that it would have to be shown to the satisfaction of the
jury."
Insanity, self-defense and duress are all affirmative defenses. The
burden is on the Commonwealth to prove all the elements necessary
to constitute the crime of robbery, and as the felonious intent is a constituent and necessary element of the crime, the burden of proof is on
the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant had the felonious intent.
But the felonious intentt is presumed from circumstances accompanying
the taking by the prisoner. 34 Cyc. 1809, Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418.
And this presumption of felonious intent stands until overcome by a
fair preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. And when the
defendant attempts to negative this felonious intent he must do so by
a fair preponderance of the evidence.
While we do so with much reluctance, yet we are compelled to say
that the charge of the trial judge was correct and in accordance with
the law of this State.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
One of the most pleasant fictions known to the law is the alleged
principle that in order to convict one of crime his guilt must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Admitting the propriety of allowing the Courts, in absence of evidence, to act upon certain presumptions which have a real basis in fact,
it is nevertheless true that to give the principle referred to an application coextensive with its terms, it should be held that if the prisoner
creates in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the existence
of any element of the crime with which he is charged he should be acquited.
A crime consists of two elements-a criminal intent and a criminal
act. The criminal act is always physicial and may be both physical and
mental. When the criminal act as defined by law is partly physical and
partly mental, the mental part of the act is technically known as the
specific intent.
If in order to convict of a crime it is necessary to prove the guilt of
the person charged beyond a reasonable doubt, it follows that if the
evidence of the accused creates a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the criminal intent or physical act or specific intent he should be acquitted.
Such, however, is not the law. One may be convicted of crime, tho
a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the specific intent was raised
by evidence of drunkenness, and one may be convicted, tho a reasonable
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doubt as to the existence of the criminal intent is raised by evidence of
infancy, insanity, mistake of fact or self-defense.
There is no good ground upon which a case where the defense was
duress can be distinguished from these cases, and in order to be consistent the courts of Pennsylvania would very probably hold, as they
have in cases of insanity, drunkness and self-defense, that the burden
was upon the prisoner to prove his defense of duress by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
This is the position taken by the supreme court of Ohio in a recent
case. In S. v. Sappienza, 840 S. 63, a prisoner charged with robbery
defended on the ground that he acted under duress. The lower court
charged that the burden was upon the defendant to prove the duress
by a fair preponderance of the evidence and in affirming the judgment
of the lower court the supreme court said, "In the nature of things this
was an affirmative defense, one which it was incumbent on the defendant to make out by a preponderance of the evidence. This was so, because the principle that the burden of proof is on the state has reference
to the corpus delicti and the defendant's complicity; but, when the defendant relies upon distinct substantive matter the burden of proving
such matter is on the defendant."
Judgment affirmed.

ESTATE OF ADAM

TAYLOR

Devisavit vel non-Declaration of Executor
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an issue devisavit vel non. The executor made three declarations, viz.: That the signature was appended to will by him; that
same will was a forgery, and that the same was done to benefit legatees.
The will gives 9-10 of estate of $100,000 to strangers and 1-10 to next of
kin. The next of kin offered evidence to prove these declarations, but
Court refused same.
Steckel for Plaintiff.
Watson for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
McCANN, J.-Under the will the next of kin were only to receive
one-tenth of the devised property, and strangers were to receive the
other nine-tenths.
The next of kin in contesting the will offered several assertions of
'the testator to show that the testator's signature was a forgery and
that he, the executor, forged it.
The assertions are hearsay, and the only question to be decided is
whether or not these come within any of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule.
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The counsel for the next of kin contend that-they should be admitted on grounds of spontaneity. According to Greenleaf on Evidence,
Page 264, § 162, the assertions must be made "at a period of time so
closely connected with the transaction that there has been no opportunity for subsequent reflection as to what might or might not be wise for
him to say.2"
In the case at bar it does not appear when the assertions were made,
and it would be unfair to assume that they were said at a time which
would bring them within this exception.
The only other exception which we think affords a possible chance
of the admission of the evidence is statements by a party against
interest. The general rule, or.one of thd requisites, is that the party
must be dead, but this has been'overruled in Penna. 8 Watts. 77. Another requsite is that'the declaration must have been made against a
pecuniary interest. According to dictum in the case of Schellenburger's
Executor v. Institution, 28 Pa. 456 (459), an executor is not a party in
interest. Another requisite is that the Court must be satisfied that the
declarant had no motive to falsify the fact declared. We are not disposed to state whether or not the Court was satisfied as to this last requisite, but we think, considering the fact that the heirs received only
1-10 and strangers 9-10 of the estate, a court might look upon the assertion with well-grounded suspicion.
We think that the above mentioned are the only channels through
which the evidence might be admitted, and we don't think the lower
court erred in refusing to admit them.
While it appears to work hardship on the heirs to rule the evidence
out, we can see no grounds for the justification of its admission, and we
reluctantly affirm the decree of the lower court.

OPINION Or SUPERIOR COURT
The overwhelming weight of authority is on the effect that where
there are several devisees or legatees, the declarations or admissions
of one of them are not admissible to impeach the will. 40 Cyc. 1290; 38
L. R. A. N. S. 733. Deitrich v. Deitrich, 4 Watts. 167; Nussear v. Arnold,
13 S. & R. 323; Clark v. Morrison, 25 Pa. 456. In Lightner v. Wike, 4
S. & R. 203, the declarations of a devisee, who was also executor to the
effect that there was no will, were held to be properly excluded, and in
Clark v. Morrison, 25 Pa. 453, the declarations of one who was executor
and principal devisee were held inadmissible.
If the declarations of an executor, who is also a devisee or legatee,
are not admissible, surely the declarations of one who is merely executor
are not admissible. The authorities so hold. Bunyard v. McB,1roy, 21
Ala. 311; Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474, 40 Cyc. 1240.
Judgment affirmed.

